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The End of Responsible Relative Liability
MARK C. WEBER
ABSTRACT: Responsible relative liability laws exist to shift some of the cost of care of
residentially placed handicapped children from the state to the children's parents. Because
residential placement of handicapped children, particularly developmentatly disabled children,
would not be undertaken but for the need to teach these children life skills, the Education for the
Handicapped Act would dictate that these placements be free of cost to parents. Recently, the
courts have resolved the tension between the preexisting state-responsible relative laws and the
Education for the Handicapped Act. Ruling in favor of the parents, they have invalidated the
responsible relative charges. This article describes the conflict, its resolution in the recent case
Parks V. Pavkovic, and some of the implications of that decision.

• On July 1, 1985, the second last day of its
1984-85 term, the United States Supreme Court
denied review in Parks v. Pavkovic (1985), a
decision of the federal Court of Appeals in
Chicago. In the Parks case, the Court of Appeals
held that it was a violation of the Education of
the Handicapped Act (1970) for the State of
Illinois to fail to pay private schools of handicapped children a responsible relative liability
charge, a monthly fee that applied to all children
placed by the Illinois Department of Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities. The fee,
which the schools attempted to collect from the
children's parents, increased with the parents'
income to a statutory maximum of $100 monthly
for an income of $15,600. The Court of Appeals
affirmed an injunction against the practice of
leaving the fee unpaid, and ordered that the State
of Illinois pay any unpaid bills that parents had
for the fee, back to September 1978. The court
ruled, however, that the State did not have to
reimburse parents who had paid the charge to
the schools.
Because the Supreme Court's decision was
a denial of review, and not a decision on the
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merits of the case, it does not set a binding
precedent for all the courts in the country.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals decision is
a conclusive interpretation of the law for federal
courts in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana. It has
already been followed in a federal court in
Florida, and the Supreme Court's refusal to
review it may further enhance its persuasive
value. Thus the ruling could have an important
effect in the many states that charge parents
some of the cost of placements of handicapped
children made by mental health, welfare, and
other state agencies.

THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBLE RELATIVE
LIABILITY

Responsible relative liability statutes long predated the Education for the Handicapped Act
(1970). Responsible relative liability is a means
to defray some of the cost of caring for those
persons who are maintained in public or private
institutions. Historically, in jurisdictions where
responsibility for care of the poor, insane,
crippled, or feebleminded was assigned to local
govemments, these governments were permitted to make charges against the estates of the
people cared for or against relatives with a legal
obligation for their support. As states took over
responsibility for the care of the dependent.
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state agencies were granted similar power to
make charges.
Illinois's system was typical. Before the
implementation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1978, the public schools
routinely excluded retarded or mentally ill
children. Even since that time, they have often
failed to act promptly (or act at all) to place those
in need of residential schooling. Either on the
advice of school authorities or on tbeir own, the
parents of a handicapped child would apply to
the state Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities, which, if it judged
that residential placement of tbe child was
advisable, would issue an "individual care
grant," a commitment to fund tbe placement of
the child. The Department would find a school
or other institution and process the papers for
enrollment. The Department would also calculate the amount that the parents were expected
to pay. If placement was in a private school, the
amount would simply be deducted from what the
Department paid on the child's behalf, leaving
the school to collect the difference.

relative liability charges, by definition, are
charges to the parents of a handicapped child for
a residential program. Even if they are specifically tagged to costs that are not strictly
"educational," such as room and board, tbey
are forbidden under tbe EHA whenever the
placement "is necessary to provide special
education and related services."
One can imagine the shock of a state mental
health administrator upon leaming that because
the state education agency receives federal
money, the mental health agency can no longer
impose a charge that it has long counted on to
make up some of the cost of a very expensive
benefit to families of the bandicapped. The
mental health agency's criteria for placement
may not even directly consider what setting the
child needs for education. And now the agency
is faced with the full cost when another agency
is getting the federal reimbursement.
RESPONSIBLE RELATIVE LIABILITY
LITIGATION
Early Challenges

COLLISION WITH THE SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAWS
The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, now codified as part of the
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA),
mandated that all handicapped children, including the mentally retarded and mentally ill, are
to be given a free, appropriate public education
in those states that receive federal subsidies for
special education.
One of tbe main concems of the framers of
the 1975 legislation was that parents needed to
be free of cost disincentives if their children
were to receive appropriate services. Regulations issued to enforce the Act state unequivocally that where a cbild is so severely bandicapped tbat "placement in a public or private
program is necessary to provide special education and related services..., the program, including non-medical care and room and board, must
be at no cost to the parents of tbe child" (Code
of Federal Regulations sec. 300.302, 1987).
Another regulation makes it irrelevant that a
mental health department or other state agency
whose primary responsibilities are not educational made the placement (Code of Federal
Regulations sec. 3OO.2(b), 1987). Responsible
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In the face of reluctance by state officials to
comply with the law, parents who want the
benefit of a free residential schooling for their
handicapped children have been forced to resort
to litigation. The cases on responsible relative
liability got off to a halting start. Between 1978
and 1980, various state courts in New Jersey and
New York upheld responsible relative cbarges
against somewhat oblique challenges based
primarily on state law (Guempel v. State, 1978;
Levine v. State, 1980). In the only case in which
the EHA was extensively discussed, the court
relied on the fact that the parents never
challenged the placing authority's determination
that the child did not need a residential school
to meet bis educational needs (Lawrence T. v.
Julia T, 1980).

A successful challenge to responsible relative
liability charges was a relatively obscure feature
of Smith V. Robinson, the 1984 United States
Supreme Court case in which tbe Court mled
that attomeys fees were not available under the
EHA. The trial court in that case ruled that a
placement offered by a state mental health
agency was not "appropriate" because it entailed a responsible relative charge to the parents
of the handicapped child. Nevertheless, this
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June 1981 decision, affirmed in an unpublished
opinion by a federal appeals court, did not
consider the general practice of making the
charge.

The Parks Case
Lester Parks was excluded from the Chicago
Public Schools wben he wasfivebecause be was
autistic. His mother searched for altemative
educational settings for him, ultimately applying
to the Illinois Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities (DMHDD) on tbe
Chicago Board's advice. DMHDD placed Lester
at a private residential school; a responsible
relative liability portion of tbe cost was left
unpaid. Tbe Parks family filed an administrative
appeal with DMHDD, arguing that the cbarge
violated the EH A. They lost and appealed to
state court. DMHDD admitted to tbe court that
Lester's residential placement was needed for
him to make educational progress, but contended tbat since DMHDD did not receive EHA
funds, it was not bound by the Act. The court
found that tbe agency was bound and barred it
from making the charge. Tbe Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court (Parks v. Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities, 1982). The Illinois Supreme Court
refused to accept the agency's furtber appeal.
Wbile the state court case was pending,
Lester's school notified parents of cbildren tbere
that it was about to close. Tbe Parks family
requested that DMHDD and the Chicago school
system move their son to a different placement.
They did, placing him at Willowglen Academy
in Milwaukee. But because tbe court action was
an administrative review proceeding only of the
charges at tbe first school, DMHDD refused to
apply tbe court's decision to the new placement.
Exercising tbeir rights under the EHA, tbe Parks
family filed a due process hearing request over
the responsible relative liability cbarge for the
Willowglen placement. The hearing officer ordered the Chicago Board of Education to pay tbe
totality of the cost of the placement in the future,
but ruled that tbere was no administrative
authority to order the Board to pay back
charges. The Board ignored tbe order; appeals
were filed to the review section of the State
Board of Education, which failed to make any
decision. Meanwhile, Willowglen issued a dis-
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charge notice because of the failure to pay tbe
accumulated monthly cbarges.
Tbe Parks family filed suit in United States
District Court asking for an immediate injunction to make tbe State of Illinois and the Chicago
Board of Education pay the entirety of Lester's
bill and tbus keep him at school, and also asking
for a classwide, permanent injunction to prevent
the charging of responsible relative liability for
other cbildren. Both orders were ultimately
entered.
In the District Court, the public authorities
defending the case broke into two groups. Tbose
associated with the State Board of Education
had no clear defense of tbe charges, but argued
tbat no remedy existed under tbe EHA against
the State Board. Those associated witb tbe
Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities defended tbe charges, saying
tbat if tbe EHA required free residential placement it was unconstitutional, because elimination of the financial disincentive to residential
placement would lead to unnecessary restrictions of bandicapped children's liberty.
Prentice Marsball, the District Judge, felt
tbat tbe practice of charging responsible relative
liability was blatantly illegal. "Tbis is a disturbing case," be wrote. "Plaintiffs bave brougbt to
our attention one of tbe most blatant violations
of federal law imaginable. It appears tbat the
State of Illinois bas been openly violating the
rights of bandicapped cbildren." Tbe judge
characterized the arguments of tbe State Board
of Education as "finger-pointing"; Essentially,
all it did was claim tbat it was not responsible
for the mental health department's violation of
tbe law, despite tbe fact that under tbe EHA the
state education agency bas the ultimate responsiblity to ensure tbat no bandicapped cbild is
denied a free education. Tbe judge labeled the
DMHDD's argument on tbe EHA's supposed
incentive for unnecessary residential placement
as "frivolous," given the fact tbat the EHA
requires all placements—residential or not—to
be free, and that tbere are otber, independent
guarantees in the Act for placement in the least
restrictive environment (Parks v. Pavkovic,
1983).
In June 1983, tbe District Court certified the
case as a class action on behalf of roughly 1,200
families, and entered an injunction that the State
of Illinois and tbe Chicago Board of Education
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not leave DMHDD responsible relative liability
unpaid for handicapped children in private
special education placements. A "special education placement" was defined as a placement
made pursuant to an Individualized Education
Plan (IEP) which provided for the placement.
The court order also required the defendants to
pay the back liability charges or reimburse
parents for them from September I, 1978,
forward.
The defendants appealed, arguing for the first
time that the children whose placements carried
responsible relative liability were a special
category of handicapped children, those placed
for reasons of developmental disability. But the
defendants never denied that the developmentally disabled children who were subject to the
charges needed their placements in order to
learn; in fact, the definition of "developmental
disability" they advanced led the Court of
Appeals to equate it with mental retardation and
conclude that placement for reasons of mental
retardation had to be placement for educational
reasons.
The court noted that the EHA was plainly
designed to cover children who are mentally
retarded, and that a mentally retarded child
would not necessarily require a residential
placement apart from the need for education and
training in life skills. The court stressed that
living expenses are not "caused by educational
needs, for they would be incurred whether or
not any effort is made to educate the child"
(Parks V. Pavkovic, 1985). But that does not
matter. What matters is that placement outside
the home is needed to educate. In that instance,
all the living expenses have to be met.
The Court of Appeals modified the monetary
relief ordered for the class by the District Court.
It held that the EHA did not permit reimbursement of parents for the money they had sent to
the schools to cover the responsible relative
liability charge. Nevertheless, it ruled that the
State had to pay any responsible relative liability
bills the parents had left unpaid. The Court
reasoned that the former relief was mere
damages, which were not intended to be a
remedy under the EHA, while the latter payments were related to keeping the children in
school in the future (Parks v. Pavkovic, 1985).
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Subsequent Litigation

On June 21, 1985, in Jenkins v. Sfate of Florida,
a federal judge in Florida ruled that the state
could not charge parents a responsible relative
fee for placements of the developmentally
disabled. The court relied on Parks v. Pavkovic
in entering a classwide injunction and order to
pay unpaid bills. Expert testimony at the trial
of the Jenkins case had stressed the role of the
non-school-day hours of residential placement
of the severely retarded in teaching them life
skills. Both the objectives and methods used
were the same as those of the program during
the school-day hours. Calling the residential
program "habilitation" rather than "education"
was a distinction without a difference.
IMPLICATIONS

The Parks case applied only to private special
education placements in one state, and it
eliminated the responsible relative liability
charges of only one state agency, the Illinois
Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. But its logic should apply to
placements in public institutions, to state agencies other than departments of mental health,
and to other states. A trend in this direction may
already be developing with the Jenkins (1985)
decision. Responsible relative liability charges
are a remnant of the system that existed before
passage of the EHA. They cannot be defended
in the face of the duty to provide a free education
to all handicapped children.
The absence of retroactive reimbursement
for parents who paid the charges in Parks (1985)
might be an incentive for states to keep
responsible relative liability systems in place
until they are forced to change by the court
action. But the refusal to order reimbursement
may not be followed by other courts. The United
States Supreme Court ruled in April 1985 that
reimbursement of the costs of a residential
placement is a proper remedy in a lawsuit under
the EHA. The case, Burlington School Committee V. Department of Education (1985), interpreted the court remedies language of the EHA
in a manner totally contrary to the approach of
the Court of Appeals in Parks (1985). It said that
reimbursement of the costs of the school were
part of the "appropriate relief that is permitted
under the EHA, where the Parks (1985) court
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had said that these payments to parents were
not.
Under Burlington (1985), reimbursement is
not automatic in every case. Burlington involved
parents unilaterally moving their child to a
private residential school while pursuing through
due process procedures a dispute over the
appropriateness of the placement proposed by
a school district. The Court held that where the
parents in such a case ultimtely prevailed, that
is, where their placement was found appropriate
and that proposed by the district was found
inappropriate, the parents were entitled to
reimbursement for the cost of the placement.
But if the district's proposal were found to be
appropriate, the pjirents would bear their own
expenses.
This restriction does not, however, affect the
situation of parents seeking reimbursement of
responsible relative liability charges. In these
cases the placement is in no sense unilateral.
Instead, it was made by a public agency. And
there will be no doubt but that the placement
was appropriate, for it will be that agreed to by
the parent and the public agency. Thus Burlington's interpretation of the EHA would appear
to require reimbursement of charges paid by
parents.
A final issue is whether, if responsible
relative liability is eliminated, state mental
health and welfare agencies will simply eliminate
all placement of handicapped children, leaving
the total responsibility of these children to the
state education agency and the local school
districts. Although the EHA does not require
any particular state agency to be the one that
provides services to handicapped children, it
does provide some controls on abandonment of
responsibility by agencies currently providing
services. One of these is that such an agency
cannot simply end its services without affording
the children it serves the procedural protections
ofthe EHA. The EHA regulations are quite clear
that each agency in a state is responsible for
ensuring that the protections ofthe Act are given
to children referred to or placed in private
schools and facilities by that agency (Code of
Federal Regulations sec. 300.2(c), 1987).
The second control is that no state receiving
EHA money can diminish the funds that it
allocates to education of the handicapped in the
face of funding increases from the federal
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government, nor can it use federal moneys to
supplant state or local funds currently being used
(Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.
sec. 1414 (a)(2)(B); Code of Federal Regulations
sec. 300.230, 1987). Thus if state mental health
or welfare agencies get out of the business of
making new placements for the handicapped, the
money that they currently spend for doing so
could not simply be saved. It would have to be
reallocated to other activities that are part of the
education of handicapped children, such as
residential placements made by local school
districts or the state education agency. Moreover, the duty of the state as a whole remains
to provide a full continuum of alternative
placements for handicapped children, including
residential placement when it is appropriate.
This duty is absolute, and applies no matter
which state agency is charged with making
placements.
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